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“Economic development” and gender equality: explaining 
variations in the gender poverty gap after socialism 
 
Éva Fodor – Dániel Horn 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using the 2008 cross-sectional wave of the survey Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) and multi-level modeling techniques, this paper explores the macro-level 
determinants of the gender poverty gap in the ten post-socialist European Union member 
states.  In dialogue with the literature on the impact of economic development on gender 
inequality in Asia and Latin America, we find that fast-paced, foreign capital led economic 
growth is associated with a larger gender poverty gap in Central and Eastern Europe, while 
generous welfare policies, specifically higher levels of spending on pensions and family 
policies are correlated with women’s lower relative destitution. These findings evaluate the 
impact of neo-liberal style “economic development” on gender inequality in a geo-politically 
specific context and suggest that structural adjustment and global market integration may 
exacerbate women’s vulnerability even when they are well equipped with human capital and 
other resources to compete with men in the labor market. 
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A „gazdasági fejlődés" és a nemek közötti egyenlőség:  
a szegénység nemek közötti varianciájának vizsgálata a 
kelet-európai átmenet után 
 
Fodor Éva – Horn Dániel 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
E tanulmány az EU–SILC adatbázis felhasználásával többszintű regressziós módszerekkel 
vizsgálja a nemek közötti szegénységi különbségek makrogazdasági meghatározóit tíz kelet-
európai országban. Az ázsiai, illetve a latin amerikai országok adatainak felhasználásával 
készült hasonló kutatásokkal megegyezően ez a tanulmány is azt találja, hogy a külföldi 
tőkebeáramlás által vezetett gazdasági növekedés Kelet-Európában is együtt járt a nemek 
közötti szegénységi különbségek felerősödésével. Eközben a jóléti állam kiterjesztése, és 
különösen a nyugdíjakra fordított összegek, illetve a családokat segítő intézkedések 
kiterjesztése jól korrelál a nők kisebb relatív szegénységével. Ezek a megfigyelések 
hozzásegítenek megérteni a neoliberális típusú „gazdasági növekedés” hatását a nemek 
közötti egyenlőtlenségekre az adott térségben. Ezek alapján arra a következtetésre jutunk, 
hogy a rendszerváltás utáni strukturális kiigazítás és a globális piachoz való integrálódás 
felerősíthette a nők elszegényedésének esélyét még úgy is, hogy alapvetően fel voltak vértezve 
a megfelelő humán tőkével és egyéb forrásokkal a férfiakkal való munkaerőpiaci versenyben. 
 
Tárgyszavak: gazdasági fejlődés, szegénység, nem, SILC 
 
JEL kódok: J16, P36, I32, C21  
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When we look at the whole world - or at least as many data points as are available to the 
industrious researcher- evidence points to a positive association between the level of 
economic development and various aspects of gender equality.   As economic growth 
progressed in the past centuries the gender gap in educational attainment, labor force 
participation and mortality has declined (Charles 2011; Dorius and Firebaugh 2010), 
women’s access to positions of political power increased  (Moore and Shackman 1996)  
and women’s overall well-being, measured by the composite GDI or GEM indices, 
improved (Forsythe et al 2000).  
There are reasons, however, to be doubtful about the promise of economic 
development for women’s emancipation.  Researchers have noted rising gender 
inequality in countries subjected to structural adjustment and global market integration 
and have argued that these processes often results in a devaluation of women’s skills, 
gender discrimination in employment, the increasing vulnerability of workers in a labor 
market dominated by profit hungry transnational capitalists, as well as the 
contamination of natural resources used for subsistence by poor households  (Boserup 
1970; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Shittirak 1988; Tinker 1990, Ward 1993). 
These arguments rely heavily on research conducted in developing Latin 
American, Asian and African countries, where prior to the introduction of structural 
adjustment policies (SAP’s) women’s level of education and experience in the formal 
labor market had been significantly inferior to those of men and thus their vulnerability 
to patriarchal subjugation had been especially pronounced.  Post-socialist societies in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) provide a different arena to test and reformulate 
theories about the relationship between modern day “economic development” and 
gender inequality.   
In this article we use the term “economic development” to refer to a change in the 
volume of GDP achieved through the application of structural adjustment policies.  SAP’s 
are a type of development policy, inspired by the neoliberal economic model of the 
Washington consensus and employed extensively in the countries of the global South 
(Beneria 1999).    They typically include capital and labor market deregulation, currency 
devaluation, trade and financial liberalization, the encouragement of global market 
integration, as well as, importantly, austerity in state spending.   We use “economic 
development” as shorthand to indicate both these policies and their intended 
consequences for GDP growth because the two seem difficult to disentangle:  they 
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simultaneously appear as goals to be attained and instruments to be used in the 
development discourse of international policy institutions.   
CEE countries followed different varieties of the structural adjustment path 
towards global market integration but they started this process with a fully trained, 
highly experienced, primarily urban female labor force, low levels of fertility, absolute 
poverty and class inequality as well as a lengthy history of state provided welfare.   We 
thus ask the following two questions.  First, in this context, what is the impact of 
“economic development” on gender inequality in poverty?   Second, what aspect of this 
process is likely to affect the gender poverty gap the most and what does this suggest 
about the emerging gender regimes in post-socialist societies? 
A sharp decline in the volume of production and employment levels followed the 
collapse of the state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s.  Class, race and gender inequalities visibly deepened everywhere, although to 
different degrees (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010; Pascall and Kwak 2005; Szelenyi and 
Ladanyi 2006).   In 2008, poverty ratesi in the newly minted capitalist economies were, 
on average, higher than those found in more developed continental European Union 
member states and varied between 9% (in the Czech Republic) and 34% (in Latvia, see 
Table 1, column 6).  The gender poverty gap, i.e. the proportion of men’s poverty rate to 
that of women’s, ranged from women’s slight relative advantage (in Hungary and 
Poland) to large gender gaps indicating women’s increased vulnerability (in the Czech 
Republic and Bulgaria, see table 1, column 4). 
In this article we begin to explain this cross-country variation in the gender 
poverty gap and contribute to the rapidly growing literature on the local correlates of 
global gender inequality.  Unlike in previous studies our goal is not merely to assess 
whether or not women disproportionately bear the burden of the post-socialist transition 
(Einhorn 1993; Fodor 1997; Ghodsee 2005; Glass 2008).   Rather we explore some of the 
macro-economic and institutional factors, which shape the level of gender inequality in 
post-socialist countries and identify the conditions under which women fare better or 
worse relative to men during and after global market integration.  In the process we 
characterize the nature of the social and economic transformation itself, of which 
practices, ideologies and assumptions of gender relations are a constitutive part. 
We use the 2008 wave of the European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) and a set of multilevel logistic regression models to explore 
variations across ten Central and East European (CEE) countries in the gender poverty 
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gap.   We argue that fast growing, foreign capital- dependent post-socialist economies 
tend to sustain higher levels of gender inequality in poverty.  In addition, we show that 
the key determinant of the gender poverty gap is the lack of social protection.  Although 
the literature on gender and the welfare states is extensive, the importance of the state 
and the public sector is under-explored in all but the most recent scholarship on “gender 
and development.”  Post-socialist countries in the process of marketization prompt us to 
integrate these two fields and add the state back into discussions of women’s role in 
“development.” 
  
“ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” AND THE GENDER POVERTY GAP  
 
After the disintegration of the state socialist regimes in 1990, productive assets in 
Central and Eastern European countries were quickly privatized, market exchange 
replaced state redistribution as the central mechanism for the allocation of resources, 
prices and wages were liberalized, state spending was cut back and redirected.  Foreign 
capital investment flocked to the region, along with advisors from the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Union, providing not only capital and loans but also 
blueprints for the integration of the post-socialist countries into the global economy and 
for their accession to European Union membership.   The IMF underwrote loans with 
strict conditionalities attached, most of which followed the structural adjustment scripts 
introduced in other areas of the world: they required, among others, closely monitored 
limits on government spending, increased labor market flexibility, controls on wage 
growth, financial deregulation and the creation of favorable conditions for foreign capital 
penetration.  While the toolkits were quite similar, each country adopted different 
aspects and pursued somewhat divergent paths to privatization, liberalization and 
growth depending on their geo-political and economic position, as well as their industrial 
structure, political opportunities and debt legacies (Bohle and Greskovits 2012; 
Drahokoupil 2009; Hamm, King and Stuckler 2012).  The similarities among CEE 
countries help us control for some of the political-historical factors of interest and the 
differences allow us to identify the impact of a handful of elements of “economic 
development” on gender inequality in poverty.  Specifically we focus on macro-economic 
policies (FDI investment, financial deregulation) and growth, as well as institutional 
factors, such as government spending overall and on pensions and family policies in 
particular.  
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Macro-economic policies for development: foreign direct investment, 
financial liberalization and growth 
 
Foreign direct investment has played a monumental role in reshaping the structure of 
production in the global South.   Transnational factories and corporations, relocating to 
Latin American, Asian and most recently to Central and East European countries, have 
created a multitude of work opportunities targeting especially “docile” and “nimble 
fingered” women (Ong 1987, Mies 1994, Ward 1994).   But such employment is often 
unhealthy, unstable, highly exploitative and may exacerbate rather than eliminate 
capitalist patriarchal subjugation (Enloe 2000, Fernandez- Kelley 1983).   Global 
competition to attract investments has led to a lowering of labor standards and the 
worsening of the conditions of work: informal jobs, subcontracting, temporary and ad 
hoc work arrangements have proliferated affecting women disproportionately (Kudva 
and Beneria 2005).   Furthermore, export-oriented production has exacerbated the 
disruption of village communities and the erosion of the “commons” (Isaksen, Devi and 
Hochschield 2010), caused migration and displacement in unforeseen proportions 
(Sassen 2003), and has contributed to an increase in women’s work burden and 
economic and personal vulnerability (Beneria 2003, Mies 1999).    
Financial liberalization is a similarly important policy goal of structural 
adjustment packages.  Neo-liberal policy makers claim that state control over financial 
markets impedes productivity through creating a disincentive for investments, which 
ultimately stunts economic growth.   But the de-regulation of financial markets is 
potentially quite problematic for gender equality as it may lead to increased volatility, an 
emphasis on market –based solutions for social problems, and thus more vulnerability 
for those in a weaker bargaining position, i.e., women (Braunstein 2012, Seguino et al 
2009). 
Overall, researchers have shown that structural adjustment fueled growth does 
not necessarily lead to more gender equality in access to credit and decent employment  
(Beneria 2003, Berik and Rogers 2009), in wages (Seguino 2000, Standing 1999, 
Braunstein 2012), in participation in political or economic decision making or in 
improvements in health outcomes (Kabeer 2009).  At least in the initial phases of growth 
researchers have found that women’s overall wellbeing declines both in absolute terms 
and relative to men’s (Boseerup 1970, Forsythe 2000).  In fact, some evidence suggests 
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that rather than simply being its cause, gender inequality in wages has actually fueled 
economic growth in Latin American economies: women’s meager pay has served as an 
incentive for foreign investors as it allowed them to keep labor costs exceptionally low 
(Berik, van der Meulen Rodgers and Seguino 2009; Seguino 2000). 
On the other hand, it is doubtless that foreign direct investment has created more 
employment options and especially new opportunities for urban lower skilled women, 
bringing about a veritable ‘feminization of employment’ (Mason and King 2001, 
Tzannatos 1999, Standing 1999).  Even if these jobs are typically of rather poor quality 
they may be considered an improvement over what had been available earlier and 
women gain a degree of economic independence not experienced before (Lim 1983).  
Women’s wages have increased more than men’s in a number of developing countries 
(Tzannatos 1999, World Bank 2001) and there is some evidence to suggest that micro-
credit arrangements were occasionally successful in reducing the gender gap in poverty 
(Kabeer 2009).  Women’s gradual economic empowerment is expected to be followed by 
a decline in fertility, as well as the emergence of more educational and public sphere 
opportunities for all, including girls, and an overall erosion of inequalities based on 
ascription (Charles 2011).   Among richer countries, researchers have in fact 
demonstrated a positive relationship between economic growth and gender equality as 
measured by GEM (Forsythe et al 2000) or by standard poverty indicators (Wieping and 
Mass 2005). 
These conflicting views on the impact of structural adjustment policies may be 
easier to reconcile if we examine the SAP elements separately focusing on a single 
dimension of gender inequality and in a relatively homogenous context.  We pursue this 
route below by formulating hypotheses about the impact of foreign direct investment, 
financial liberalization and the rate of economic growth on the gender poverty gap in 
post-state socialist societies.  
In the beginning of the 21st century the rate of average economic growth in 
Central and Eastern Europe exceeded that in the other EU member states.   Yet 
variations were significant among the ten post-socialist countries: the annual growth in 
Hungary in 2007 was registered at less than 1% but over 10% in Slovakia. The Baltic 
countries, especially Estonia posted similarly vigorous growth rates before 2008.  
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Hypothesis 1a:  In CEE gender inequality in poverty is expected to be larger in 
countries, which exhibit higher rates of growth (net of their level of development).   As 
the arguments we presented above suggest such growth may be realized through keeping 
wages low and offering informal jobs amidst bleak work conditions.  Indeed, the median 
wage in post-state socialist countries is significantly lower than the EU average and 
according to a recent ILO report (2014) a growing proportion of the employed 
population works in “vulnerable jobs”: informally, with temporary contracts or receiving 
sub-minimum wages (for euphemistically called “internships” or “public works”).  In 
such contexts women may be more vulnerable than men due to discrimination based on 
at least two factors: women’s and especially mothers’ perceived lower productivity 
because of their domestic responsibilities, as well as widely held convictions about men’s 
priority over women at hiring when jobs are scarce (Dunn 2004, Glass and Fodor 2011, 
Weiner 2007).   
 Foreign capital investments have had a profound impact on the Central and 
Eastern European transformation process.  By 2007, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
stocks amounted to a third to two thirds of each country’s GDP (Bandelj 2007).  Foreign 
direct investment is correlated with a higher level of class inequality in CEE, because, 
among other reasons, such investments are likely to inflate the wages of highly skilled 
workers relative to all others (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010). These highly skilled 
managerial workers tend to be men, so foreign direct investment is expected to increase 
gender inequality as well.  In addition, not all FDI’s are the same.  Bohle and Greskovits 
(2012) argue that the industries, which entered CEE after 2000 fostered especially weak 
labor organizations and thus foreign investors have excessive amounts of power over 
workers, which lead to conditions well below Western European labor standards.  Thus a 
dependence on foreign capital in CEE resulted in a decline in workers’ overall bargaining 
power, work security and may have exacerbated exploitation.  Researchers also note that 
foreign direct investment in the 2000s tends to favor light industries in the less 
developed countries of the region; textile and food production factories offer low-skilled 
work opportunities predominantly for women (Dunn 2004).  These feminized jobs are 
poorly paid, increasingly insecure and home based, thus contributing to women’s 
vulnerability rather than improving their lot relative to men’s.   
Indeed, liberalization and privatization in the financial sector was pervasive in 
many CEE countries as it is evidenced, for example, by the proportion of foreign and 
state ownership of banks (Andries and Capraru 2013).   The state retained absolutely no 
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ownership in the banking sector in Estonia and Lithuania, suggesting a high degree of 
foreign capital dependence.  In Slovenia and Poland, on the other hand, over 20% of 
banks are owned and controlled by the state.  In terms of overall foreign investments 
(FDI flows), variations are similarly large within the post-communist region.  Between 
2004 and 2007, foreign direct investment dollars amounted to close to 30% of the GDP 
of Bulgaria, 13% of the GDP of Estonia, while it constituted less than 4% of the GDP of 
Hungary and Slovenia. 
Hypotheses 1b:  Net of the level of economic development, countries with higher levels 
of FDI are expected to have higher levels of gender inequality in povertyii.   This is so 
because we expect foreign investments in the late 2000s to be creating unstable, 
exploitative and vulnerable work opportunities, some in sweatshop like conditions 
(Bohle and Greskovits 2012).  Women may be preferred for these jobs but their risk of 
unemployment is high and their income may not pull them out of poverty.   Higher 
quality FDI in turn creates jobs which women are poorly positioned to compete for given 
their extra-work responsibilities, the amount of which has not declined in the past 
decades (Glass and Fodor 2011). 
Hypotheses 1c. Financial de-regulation (a lack of state ownership in the finance 
sector) is expected to be negatively associated with  the gender poverty gap.   While an 
international financial sector may provide excellent job opportunities for a limited 
number of highly skilled professionals, including women, it may also lead to higher 
volatility, loan policies which shun social responsibility, reduced tax revenues and a 
reduction of state control over investments.  In this context less credit may be available 
for the “riskiest” loan applicants.   These factors are expected to increase workers’ and 
especially women’s economic vulnerability and thus may lead to a higher poverty gap.   
 
Austerity and the gender poverty gap 
 
International development agencies consider austerity in government expenditure as one 
of the central tenet of structural adjustment and growth.   While generous welfare 
spending is associated with lower poverty rates in western capitalist societies 
(Kenworthy 1999; Korpi and Palme 1998; Moller et al. 2003), the relationship between 
welfare state generosity and gender equality is less straightforward.  Feminist 
comparative research on the gender poverty gap suggested that when states provide high 
levels of welfare payments to people in need, the gender poverty gap will be reduced 
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(Casper 1994; Christopher et al. 2002, Brady 2009).  This is so because welfare subsidies 
to the poor tend to benefit women and especially women with children.  Not all welfare 
subsidies function the same way, however.   Certain family-related benefits, which 
provide incentives for mothers to withdraw for lengthy periods from the labor market 
after childbirth in a context where formal childcare arrangements are scarce, may 
exacerbate the gender poverty gap (Gornick and Meyers 2009; Keck and Saraceno 2013; 
Mandel and Semoyonov 2006; Petit and Hook 2009, Misra et al 2007). 
  Unlike many other developing countries, post-socialist societies entered the 
process of global market integration with a history of extensive state redistribution, i.e., 
generous pension systems, family support policies as well as others types of income 
redistribution measures.  After 1989 a rapid retrenchment began in most countries, but 
different social provisions were eliminated or their real value was allowed to inflate at 
different rates as a result of political processes, international pressure and economic 
opportunities (Myant and Drahokoupil 2011).  What the IMF called “overly generous” 
state redistribution has been one of the key targets of structural adjustment blueprints 
and as such it is closely tied to what is considered “economic development” in the region.   
We therefore identify variations across countries in the role of the welfare state in 
poverty alleviation and explore its relationship to gender inequality.   
Since 1990, greater expenditure on welfare has been associated with lower overall 
poverty rates in CEE countries as well (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010), even though 
compared to “older” EU members, these countries spend a significantly lower percentage 
of their already significantly lower GDP on welfare.  In 2007, the year preceding our 
survey, the 27 EU countries allocated on average 26% of their GDP on social expenditure, 
while social spending in CEE ranged from a low of 12.2% (in Latvia) to a high of 22.8% 
(in Slovenia).  In terms of the actual value this percentage represents, the EU average per 
capita spending (at PPP) stood at 6,349 Euros (with none of the core countries spending 
less than 8,000 Euros), while the value of social spending ranged from 1,277 Euros to (an 
exceptionally high) 4,793 Euros in Sloveniaiii.   
There is sizable variation within Central and Eastern Europe in the way this 
spending is allocated which may have gendered consequences.   Some countries directed 
greater funds to compensate pensioners and “cleared” the labor market with generous 
early retirement options and disability pensions, others allowed a devaluation of the 
value of old-age pensions (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).  The average pension to wage 
ratio was 72% in Poland and around 60% in Hungary in the mid 1990s, but only around 
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30% in Estonia and Latvia (Myant and Drahokoupil 2011: 201). Since women outnumber 
men among the unpartnered elderly, the variation in the value of pensions will explain 
some of the cross-country differences in the gender poverty gap.   Another, smaller, but 
identifiable group in poverty is that of lone mothers.  Many CEE countries grant 
generous parental leaves and child care allowances to women on the assumption that 
they will spend a significant portion of their adult lives financially dependent on their 
families and/or on a relatively poor state – a strategy which might increase both short 
and long term poverty risks for all women and especially mothers.  However, variation 
among the countries is sizeable.  In 2007, Hungary spent 3.4% of its GDP on family 
protection measures, while similarly targeted measures only received a little over 1% of 
the GDP in many other societies (for example in Latvia, Lithuania or Bulgaria).  This 
amount is typically spent on parental leave payments, family tax breaks or cash benefits 
to parents with children. 
Hypothesis 2a:  We expect overall social spending to be negatively associated with the 
gender poverty gap: countries, which spend more on social welfare are expected to 
experience less gender inequality in poverty.   Social spending has both a direct and 
indirect effect on women’s well-being. Its direct effect is expected to be expressed 
through providing welfare benefits to those in need.  In an indirect way, social spending 
is expected to reduce women’s domestic work burden through the provision of services 
(such as health and educational services, elderly care, etc), thus free them for 
participation in the labor market. 
 Hypotheses 2b: Countries, which spend a higher percentage of their GDP on family 
related benefits may in fact have a larger gender poverty gap. These subsidies in CEE 
countries, where they are primarily spent on lengthy parental leave provisions may 
increase the poverty risk of women with children as they provide disincentives for them 
to return to the labor market yet are not generous enough to lift them out of poverty.   
This is expected to be true not only for women who currently raise small children, but 
also for women who had taken the leave earlier and had trouble returning to work 
afterwards or must accept reduced pension benefits as a result.  Instead of creating work 
opportunities and financing education for small children, conservative family policies 
may cements mothers’ marginalization in the labor market. 
Hypotheses 2c: Countries, which spend a higher percentage of their GDP on pension 
related benefits will have smaller gender poverty gaps.  The restructuring and generosity 
of pension payments is expected to reduce pensioners’ risk of poverty and since women 
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outnumber men amongst the elderly, it is also expected to lead to a smaller gender 
poverty gap. 
In the rest of the paper we test these two sets of hypotheses, related first to 
macro-economic measures and second, to state austerity.  We emphasize that we are 
really examining the same phenomenon from somewhat different, albeit related angles: 
the impact of what we call “economic development” on the gender poverty gap.   
 
DATA AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
 
Sample 
 
We included ten post-communist EU member states in this project: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
This was the whole population of post-socialist EU member societies in 2008iv.  We 
selected these countries instead of using information from all EU member states because 
we were specifically interested in the impact of structural adjustment and neo-liberal 
policy initiatives on gender inequality during global market integration.   While austerity 
measures have certainly been introduced in other parts of Europe as well, structural 
adjustment, the emergence of capitalist markets and the novelty of participating in the 
global economy are unique to CEE countries.  In addition, the consequences of similar 
policies or macro-economic phenomena take on quite different meanings here compared 
to more developed regions.  Two examples should highlight this latter point.  First, while 
foreign direct investments are important for the economy of a number of EU countries, 
transnational companies operate quite differently in core countries, such as in Belgium 
or Norway than in peripheral ones, such as in Bulgaria or Poland.  The difference in the 
quality of jobs they offer has important consequences for the life chance of their workers, 
their social vulnerability and chances of poverty.   The impact of foreign direct 
investment is thus not the same in core and semi-peripheral countriesv.  Second, 
consider the meaning of “austerity” at different levels of development.  Cutbacks in state 
spending on health care, even if the same in percentage terms, means something quite 
different for, for example, health (and poverty) outcomes at different levels of spending 
as sizable variation in mortality/ morbidity between CEE countries and “older” EU 
members states amply demonstrate.  
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In addition, post-socialist countries share a number of unique features, which 
differentiate them from other countries and which are the consequences of their state 
socialist past and their geo-political location at the peripheries of the European Unionvi.  
The factors relevant for our paper include a history of women’s labor force participation 
and of lengthy parental leaves, very early retirement thresholds especially for women, a 
high proportion of extended families, the dearth of part-time work options, weak to non-
existent labor unions and lax labor legislations, as well a significantly lower standard of 
living, much higher levels of absolute or subjective poverty, lower wages and an 
increased vulnerability especially in old age and among single parentsvii.   These 
characteristics all profoundly shape gender inequality in poverty.  To hold these as 
constant as possible in order to be able to focus on the impact of structural adjustment 
net of these other factors, we decided to limit our sample to CEE countries only.viii 
The individual level samples come from the 2008 wave of the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC 2008)ix.  These are large 
representative surveys of individuals as well as households of all EU member countries. 
For our analysis we selected un-partnered individuals, i.e. people who did not, at the 
time of the survey, share their household resources with a partner (see also Wieping and 
Maas 2005, or Elena Bárcena-Martín and Ana I. Moro-Egido, 2013).   Given that in EU-
SILC poverty is measured at the level of the household with the assumption of equal 
sharing, the gender gap can only be measured among the unpartnered.  Our sample 
group includes single individuals without children, both elderly and younger as well as 
parents raising children without a partner present in the household.  Because of this 
criterion we reduced our sample size to 69,293 for the ten countries altogetherx.   
 
The dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable in our models is the risk of poverty in 2008xi.  We employ the 
definition of poverty typically used for cross-national comparisons and consider 
someone poor whose per capita equivalized household income is less than 60% of 
his/her country’s national median.  This is a relative measure and thus is an indication of 
inequalities at the bottom of the social hierarchy rather than absolute levels of 
deprivation.  The overall poverty rate so defined was 20.5% among un-partnered 
individuals in the ten countries with 22.6% of women and 17.5% of men living in 
povertyxii.  These percentages, however, vary by country.  Figure 1 (and columns 1-3 of 
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table 1) shows the distribution of our dependent variable, the rate of poverty in each 
country broken down by gender.  The countries are arranged from low to high in terms of 
the gender poverty gap.    On the left –hand side, women are slightly less likely to be poor 
than men in Hungary and Poland, but the other countries exhibit sizable gender gaps to 
women’s disadvantage ranging from 1.2 in Slovenia to 1.8 in the Czech Republic.  The 
difference (rather than ratio) of men’s and women’s poverty shows a roughly similar 
ranking among the countries (table 1, column 4), with the Czech Republic ranked lower 
and Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania at the top.   These percentages are higher than the 
overall poverty rate in the population (except in Slovenia) suggesting that the risk of 
poverty is higher among those living without a partner. 
 
Figure 1.   
Poverty rates for un-partnered women and men in ten post-communist 
societies in CEE 
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Table 1.   
 
Distribution of the dependent variable among individuals  
over 17 years or older 
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
 
Independent variables 
 
Individual level 
 
We included a range of individual characteristics, which are known to influence people’s 
chance of poverty.  The distribution of these variables can be found in table 2.  
It is immediately obvious that there are many more un-partnered women than 
men living in the ten post-socialist countries, primarily explained by the large gender gap 
in life expectancy in this region and the fact that women are more likely to live without a 
spouse later in life.   While roughly half of the full sample are women, about 60% of 
unpartnered individuals are.  Age is coded in years and the average age for unpartnered 
women (48.4)  is higher than that of men (34.3) for the reasons we cite above.  We 
included a separate term for those over 65 (“elderly”) to account for the possible non-
linear impact of age on the odds of povertyxiii.    
 
 
 
 
 Per cent 
poor 
among un- 
partnered 
women 
Per cent 
poor 
among un- 
partnered 
men 
Per cent 
poor 
among all 
un- 
partnered 
Ratio 
(women’s 
rate/men’
s rate) 
Poverty 
difference 
(women’s 
rate 
minus 
men’s 
rate) 
Overall 
poverty 
rate in 
full  
populati
on over 
18 
N 
(full 
sample) 
N (un- 
partnered) 
Hungary 12.9 14.4 13.5 0.90 -1.5 11.0 18,378 8,138 
Poland 20.8 23.1 21.7 0.90 -2.3 17.1 33,110 12,134 
Slovenia 14.1 11.7 12.9 1.21 2.4 11.2 24,615 10,125 
Latvia 41.0 29.3 36.9 1.40 11.7 34.4 10,684 5,321 
Estonia 32.9 24.6 29.5 1.34 8.3 22.1 10,582 4,641 
Romania 30.0 21.9 26.5 1.37 8.1 23.3 16,242 5,869 
Slovakia 14.9 10.7 13.1 1.39 4.2 10.9 13,807 6,238 
Lithuania 31.8 24.1 28.8 1.32 7.7 21.1 10,284 4,059 
Bulgaria 34.8 20.8 28.9 1.67 14 26.3 10,230 3,784 
Czech R 16.0 8.9 13.0 1.80 7.1 8.6 22,431 8,912 
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Table 2.   
Distribution of the individual level variables in the models by gender 
Unpartnered individuals, full sample and lone mothers over 17 in ten post-
state socialist EU member states 
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
 
We entered education as a set of two dummy variables (secondary only, and 
college or more), as well as another binary variable to designate the work status of the 
person.  This variable is coded 1 if the person self-identifies as “working for wages”, and 
0 otherwise.  Unpartnered women are more likely to have a college degree than 
unpartnered men but men are more likely to be at work, given that they are typically 
younger and less likely to be retired.   Finally we included a variable to describe family 
status (note that everyone is “unpartnered”): those who have children in the household 
under 12 and those who do not.  These people are not necessarily single parents in the 
traditional sense of the term but may be living with others, such as for example, their 
own parents or their grandchildren.  Non-nuclear households are especially popular in 
Central and Eastern Europe so we included a variable coded 1, if the person lives in a 
household, which includes more than two adults and 0 otherwise.  Over 20% of 
unpartnered individuals live in non-nuclear households, more men than women do.   
Based on the vast literature on individual level predictors of poverty, we expect 
education and work status to lower the risk, while age, especially being elderly, as well as 
having small children in the household to increase the risk of destitution.   In separate 
models we also included a dummy variable, which described the size of the settlement 
  Unpartnered 
women 
Unpartnered 
men 
Unpartnered 
all 
Full 
sample 
women 
Full 
sample 
men 
Full 
sample 
all 
Age (mean) 48.4 34.3 42.4 49.1 45.8 47.6 
Elderly 33.8 10.2 23.9 24.5 18 21.6 
Secondary 
education 
73.9 84.5 78.3 74.4 79.9 77.0 
College or more 13.2 9.3 11.5 15.6 13.4 14.6 
Extended family 
household 
19.0 22.4 20.4 19.2 20.4 19.7 
Working for 
wages 
30.1 46.1 36.8 42.1 55.4 48.3 
Children under 
12 in household 
44.3 45.7 44.9 48.0 48.9 48.4 
Poor 22.6 17.5 20.5 17.0 14.3 15.7 
No partner - - - 44.1 36.4 40.5 
N 40,201 29,049 69,292 81,206 92,294 173,415 
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where the person lived, but as this variable is unavailable for Slovenia we did not include 
it in our multi-level models where the N at the country level is too small to afford the 
exclusion of a country.  The variable is significant, people in urban areas are less likely to 
be poor in Central and Eastern Europe, but does not influence the impact of gender 
which is our interest here. 
 
Societal level independent variables 
 
Our main interest is in the effect of societal level factors and their interaction with 
gender in predicting poverty rates.  We modeled six macro-level independent variables, 
each corresponding to one of our hypotheses.  These variables are lagged one year; they 
describe the year 2007, while our survey data were collected in 2008.  Most of the data 
come from Eurostat’s dataset and website.  For a detailed description of the variables 
and their sources, see Appendix B. 
 
Table 3.   
Distribution of country level variables in the models 
Source: see Appendix B. 
 
The level of economic development is measured as the country’s per capita GDP 
at purchasing power parity in 2007.  All post-state socialist economies cluster towards 
the bottom of the GDP distribution among European Union countries, although 
variations across them are also notable.  By 2007 none of them reached the EU average 
but Slovenia’s level of development was only 10 percentage points lower, while the 
  GDP as % 
of EU-27 
GDP 
growth 
(3 year 
ave) 
FDI 
flow 
(3 
year 
ave) 
% state 
owned 
banks 
Pension 
spending 
Social 
protection 
Family 
protection 
Bulgaria 43 6.4 29.4 1.98 6.8 15.1 1.26 
Czech R 80 6.1 6.0 2.56 8.2 18.6 2.42 
Estonia 68 6.9 12.6 0 5.8 12.5 1.73 
Hungary 64 1.0 8.1 5.6 10.4 22.3 3.40 
Lithuania 62 9.8 5.2 0 6.6 14.3 1.19 
Latvia 57 10.0 2.9 7.3 5.2 11.0 1.17 
Poland 56 6.8 5.5 20.4 11.6 18.1 1.54 
Romania 42 6.3 5.8 5.8 6.3 12.8 1.66 
Slovenia 91 6.9 3.8 26.4 9.7 21.4 1.80 
Slovakia 72 10.6 4.8 1.1 7.2 16.0 2.19 
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Bulgarian and Romanian GDP’s were merely about 40% of the EU average.  Because of 
these differences across the countries as well as the known association between per 
capita GDP and both the level of absolute poverty and the generosity of welfare 
subsidies, we will use the level of GDP in 2007 as a control variable in all the models we 
specify belowxiv.  
Economic growth describes the 3-year average of the country’s real GDP growth 
between 2005 and 2007.  We experimented with a measure for longer term growth 
(between 1999 and 2007) but the two are highly correlated and the results did not differ 
from each other, so we opted to use the short term growth measure.xv We measured the 
level of foreign direct investment flow in each country as a percent of its GDP as the 
average of the three years between 2005 and 2007xvi.   We also add a measure of 
financial openness: the proportion of banking sector owned by the state as opposed to 
foreign or domestic private investors. 
To assess the generosity of the welfare state we used a measure of the country’s 
total expenditure on social protection in 2007 as a percentage of its GDP, as well as the 
level of pension expenditure and family expenditure as a percentage of the GDP, to 
assess how more targeted benefits ease gender inequality.  
These variables cluster to form countries with specific characteristics.  The Baltic 
region represents one such cluster, which Bohle and Greskovics (2012) call “neo-liberal 
capitalism.” Note that variation among the countries even within this group is 
significant.  Nevertheless, these countries are typically characterized by high growth 
rates, high and rapidly increasing rates of foreign investment and financial de-regulation 
as well as a withdrawal of the state from the provision of social services (Estonia is the 
farthest developed in this regard).  At the other end of the spectrum we find Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic (“embedded neoliberalism”, according to Bohle 
and Greskovits, 2012) with high rates of social spending, accompanied by slower growth 
and less foreign capital penetration.  Slovenia stands out as the country, which is the 
least “open” in the sense that foreign capital penetration is the smallest overall and 
specifically in her financial markets.   The two countries at the bottom of the GDP 
distribution, Bulgaria and Romania follow rather different paths.  Neither can afford to 
allocate much to social spending but Bulgaria in the years prior to the economic crisis 
received an exceptionally great deal of foreign investment especially in light industries 
and services, such as tourism and textiles, pushing it closer to the neo-liberal strategies 
of the Baltic region than to Central Europe. 
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These clusters, including their history and the geo-political reasons behind their 
political/economic choices, have been described elsewhere.  We find the construction of 
such typologies useful, but we also note vast variations within these clusters, especially 
when contrasted with the outcome of gender inequality in poverty.  We therefore 
examine the impact of each variable first and in the conclusion of the paper return to the 
usefulness of mainstream typologies for analyzing gendered consequences. 
Above we argued that our macro-level variables describe different facets of 
“economic development” which are separated only for the purposes of analysis.  This 
becomes even clearer when we observe the correlations among the independent variables 
on the macro level (the correlation table is available upon request).  There is a strong 
association between each type of social spending and growth rates, supporting the 
argument that growth may happen at the cost of withdrawing state responsibility for 
vulnerable groups.  We explore the consequences below. 
 
Analytical strategy 
 
Given our substantive decision to restrict our analysis to post-socialist societies, the 
choice of analytical method is not trivial.   Our data are clustered within countries, hence 
we are using multi-level modeling to estimate the effect of the individual and macro-level 
variables simultaneously without biasing the standard errors of our estimates. However, 
we only have 10 cases at the second (macro) level and as we mentioned above these ten 
cases are the whole population of post-socialist countries, which were members of the 
European Union in 2008 when the data were collected.   Ten is admittedly a rather small 
number of cases for these types of models.  It is, however, not impossible to model data 
for such a small group as long as it is done with care.  In their guide to users, MLwiN’s 
creators warn about possible problems with small macro level N’s but do not rule out its 
usexvii.  Similarly, Gelman and Hills (2007) in their widely used textbook on data analysis 
do not require a larger number of cases at the macro level and encourage the use of 
multilevel modeling even if the sample size is very small, even with as few as 3 cases at 
the macro level.  There are a number of recently published examples of articles in the 
field of labor economics using multi-level models with fewer than the 20 cases typically 
recommended (see for example, Bárcena-Martín and Moro-Egido (2013), who included 
17 countries in their analysis.)      
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Given concerns about multi-level modeling with a dataset of this type, we also 
performed a slightly different kind of analysis and obtained a set of two-stage regression 
models to check our results (Gelman 2005).  This method involves running regression 
models separately for each country and then fitting a linear regression line to a second 
model with includes the coefficients (for gender in our case) from the original (in our 
case, logistic) regressions and the macro-level variables of interest.  We also present 
some of the outcome from these models in a graph formatxviii.  The results generally 
confirm our findings obtained from the multi-level models. 
We use random coefficient logistic regression models, which allow for variation 
both in the intercept and the slope of gender across countries and predicts the odds of 
being poor.  In this case our main interest will be the cross-level interaction term 
between gender and each of the macro level variables described above.   We used the 
software MLwiN (Rashbach, Steele, Browne and Godlstein 2009), and estimate 
equations of the following type using 2nd order PQL procedure (the default MQL 
procedure yields similar results): 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4 presents the unsurprising results from a multi-level random coefficient model, 
which includes individual level variables only.  Women, net of other factors, have a 
higher chance of being poor than men.  The odds ratio for the coefficient “woman” is 1.17, 
i.e. women’s odds of poverty are, net of all other factors, 1.17 times higher than that of 
men (e .16=1.17).  Among unpartnered individuals age has a curvilinear relationship with 
poverty: it increases people’s odds of poverty to a point, but the elderly enjoy a lower risk 
than others.  Education, especially post-secondary education, as well as working for 
wages reduces one’s risk of poverty, as does living in an extended household.  Having 
children in the household increases household members’ chance of poverty.   These 
findings confirm previous studies on the determinants of poverty for individuals.  We 
would like to highlight one variable.  Unlike in most western European countries, 
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extended households Central and Eastern Europe are less likely to be poor than nuclear 
ones.  Indeed, the extensive practice of the intra-household transfer of goods, money and 
labor in the region may serve as an important institution- besides the state and the labor 
market- of poverty alleviation. 
Table  4.   
 
Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) predicting 
 the odds of being poor in a random coefficient model 
Individual level variables included only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU-SILC,  2008.  
Sample: Unpartnered individuals 17 and over, 10 post-state socialist EU members states.  
* represents coefficients statistically significant at p<.05 (two tailed tests). 
 
Next we examine the impact of each set of macro-level variables and their cross-
level interaction with the variable “woman”.  We calculate these in separate equations 
(although also controlling for the level of GDP in most casesxix) given the small number 
of N at the macro level.  Tables 5-6 present these models.  The first set of factors in table 
5 address theories about the pace and character of economic development and their 
relationship to the gender poverty gap.  
Model 1.1 and 1.2 in table 5 explore the relationship between the average rate of 
economic growth between 2005 and 2007 and the odds of poverty controlling for 
 Un-
partnered 
individuals 
Woman .16* 
(.09) 
 Age .01* 
(.00) 
Elderly -.65* 
(.04) 
Secondary school -.47* 
(.03) 
College graduate -1.5* 
(.05) 
Working for wages -.96* 
(.03) 
Children under 12 in 
household 
.06* 
(.03) 
Extended household -.46* 
(.03) 
Constant -.99* 
(.14) 
N 69,293 
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individual level compositional factors and GDP per capita.  We allow the intercept and 
the slope for gender to vary across countries and interpret the coefficient associated with 
GDP growth (model 1.1) and its cross-level interaction with gender (model 1.2 and figure 
2).   Countries with a higher rate of recent economic growth expose people to higher risks 
of poverty and the gender gap is also wider in these countries.   This is demonstrated by 
the coefficient in the shaded cell in model 1.2: net of all other factors, women are more 
likely than men to be poor in CEE countries which experienced fast paced growth in the 
years prior to 2008.   The results from the two-stage model in figure 2 support this point:  
Hungary and Poland, the two countries with odds ratios for gender under 1 (i.e. where 
gender is not a risk factor for poverty, net of other variables) exhibit slow growth rates 
but the much more unequal Baltic countries grew faster in the years prior to the 
economic crisis of 2008. 
 
Figure 2.   
Results from a two-stage regression model: economic growth and women’s 
disadvantage in poverty.  EU SILC 2008. 
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Table  5.   
Logistic regression coefficients from random coefficient models predicting 
odds of being poor 
  
Hypothesis set 1: Level, pace and pattern of economic development 
 
Note: GDP per capita is used as a control variable only.  
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
Sample: Unpartnered individuals 17 and over, 10 post-state socialist EU members states.  
* indicates coefficients statistically significant at p<.05 (two tailed tests) 
(*) indicates coefficients statistically significant at p<.10  
 
The relative size of foreign investment and the proportion of state ownership over 
banks in a country describe the dependence of an economy on foreign capital, which, in 
the context of relative underdevelopment may indicate potential social problems and 
vulnerabilities, or in contrast, greater opportunities. In the post-socialist region, net of 
the level of economic development, countries where on-going foreign investment 
constitutes a bigger part of the GDP and where banks are exclusively in the hands of 
international capitalists, are burdened with higher levels of poverty (in line with the 
findings of larger social inequalities, see Bandelj and Mahutga 2010).xx  In addition, 
 Model 
1.1 
Model 
1.2 
Model 
1.3 
Model 
1.4 
Model 
1.5 
Model 
1.6 
Individual 
level 
predictors 
and GDP 
included included included included included included 
Woman .14 
(.10) 
-.51 (*) 
(.26) 
.17 (*) 
(.09) 
-.10 
(.16) 
.17* 
(.09) 
.34* 
(.10) 
GDP growth 
(3 year ave) 
.13* 
(.03) 
.10* 
(.03) 
- - - - 
GDP growth 
*woman 
- .09* 
(.03) 
- - - - 
FDI flow 
(3 year ave) 
- - -.02 
(.02) 
.00 
(.03) 
- - 
FDI flow* 
woman 
- - - .04* 
(.02) 
- - 
% state 
banks 
- - - - .02 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.02) 
% state 
banks* 
woman 
- - - - - -.03* 
(.01) 
Constant -.06 
(.46) 
-.49 
(.40) 
.65 
(.64) 
.49 
(.64) 
.29 
(.45) 
-.09 
(.19) 
N 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 
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women’s relative risk of poverty is higher in countries which had been more deeply 
exposed to foreign capital.  The positive cross-level interaction term in the shaded cell of 
model 1.4 indicates that the higher the rate of FDI flow in an economy, the larger the 
gender poverty gap, and the negative cross-level interaction term in model 1.6 shows that 
the lower the proportion of state owned banks, the higher is women’s risk of poverty 
relative to that of men, even net of the overall level of economic development in the 
country.    
Welfare spending is associated both with the level of social inequalities and with 
economic development.   Hence in the second set of models, we control for the level of 
GDP and explore the impact of a variety of social benefits on the gender poverty gap. The 
generosity of social benefits, pensions, and (as opposed to our expectations) even family 
benefits are negatively correlated with the overall risk of poverty (table 6, models 2.1, 2.3 
and 2.5).  In addition, countries, which spend a higher percentage of their GDP on social 
protection, and specifically a higher percentage of their GDP on pension and family 
protection measures, display smaller gender inequality at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy (models 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, figure 3).  The cross-level interaction term between 
gender and pension spending is especially strong.   Observe the output from the two-
stage models in figure 3, which demonstrates the same rather strong correlation between 
the percent of GDP spent on pensions and women’s relative risk of poverty.  Note that 
women’s poverty rate is especially high in Bulgaria or Latvia, where social insurance 
payments in old age are meager.  Hungary and Poland can be found at the opposite end 
of the spectrum: here the level of pension payments kept up better with the inflation rate 
and were less devalued during the two decades following 1990.   The two-step models 
allow the identification of exceptions:  the Czech Republic is an interesting case as state 
spending on pensions is quite high, yet the gender gap in poverty is also one of the 
highest in the region, suggesting that the gap is less closely related to social insurance 
than elsewhere. 
In general, the level of old age pension payments is particularly important in the 
post-socialist region, where retirement age is lower than in most developed countries, 
the life expectancy gap between men and women is large, and where the employment 
rate of older people, women especially, is also significantly lower than the international 
average (Eurostat, 2008).  The combination of these factors, as well as the unavailability 
of private pension savings in this cohort because of the state socialist period, increases 
the importance of state provided pension payments.   The finding related to family 
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benefits is contrary to our hypothesis.  We expected family protection in the CEE region 
to serve to marginalize women and increase their poverty chances because of the 
difficulty to return to the labor market after a leave, which together with the low level of 
social insurance received during the leave period may result in reducing women’s 
expected income in old(er) age.  Our models (2.5 and 2.6 in table 6) suggest the opposite.  
At least by 2007, family benefits serve as protection against poverty, especially for 
women (see also, Förster and Tóth 2000).  This, however, may change, as the cohort of 
women who had spent long years on parental leave after 1989, rather than during the 
state socialist era, start entering retirement in about a decade.   
Table  6.   
Logistic regression coefficients from random coefficient models predicting 
odds of being poor 
 
Hypothesis set 2:  Welfare state generosity and types 
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
Sample: Unpartnered individuals 17 and over, 10 post-state socialist EU members states.  
* coefficients are statistically significant at p<.05 (two tailed tests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 
2.1 
Model 
2.2 
Model 
2.3 
Model 
2.4 
Model 
2.5 
Model 
2.6 
Individual level 
predictors and 
GDP 
included included included included included included 
Woman .14 
(.10) 
.89* 
(.39) 
.15 
(.10) 
1.04 
(.25) 
.15 
(.09) 
.64* 
(.24) 
Social protection -.09* 
(.02) 
-.08* 
(.02) 
- - - - 
Social 
protection*women 
- -.05* 
(.02) 
- - - - 
Pension - - -.09* 
(-.05) 
-.07 
(.05) 
- - 
Pension*woman - - - -.12* 
(.03) 
- - 
Family protection - - - - -.34* 
(.14) 
-.34* 
(.14) 
Family 
protection*women 
- - - - - -.26* 
(.13) 
Constant 1.02* 
(.37) 
.75* 
(.39) 
.81 
(.49) 
.61 
(.49) 
.59 
(.39) 
.57 
(.39) 
N 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 
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Figure 3.  
Results from a two-stage regression model:  spending on pensions and 
women’s disadvantage in poverty. 
 
 
                                                 
i Poverty here is defined as per capita equivalized household income below 60% of the national 
median, see a more detailed description in the section on research methods below. 
ii Oostendorp (2009) found no relationship between the gender wage gap and FDI in less 
developed countries.  Poverty, however, is somewhat different from merely wages and FDI 
influences infrastructural developments, labor laws and employment policies, etc, which may not 
impact the wage gap but lead to more gender inequality in poverty. 
iii http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-02062009-BP/EN/3-02062009-BP-
EN.PDF 
iv In 2013 Croatia entered the European Union. 
v Because of the differences in the quality, volume and workings of FDI, Central and East 
European countries are classified as “dependent market economies” in recent political science 
literature (Noelke and Vliegenthart 2009). 
vi Indeed, recent research on the impact of the economic crisis of 2008 also highlight the fact that 
macro-economic change may affect gender relations and women’s social status differently in core 
and (semi)-peripheral countries of the EU (Bettio et al 2012). 
vii While some core countries may also share some of these features, the coherence in this regard 
among CEE countries is notable. 
viii Several studies have included a handful of post-socialist countries in larger samples of 
developed and developing nations (for example, Pettit and Hook 2009,  Barcena-Martin and 
Moro-Egido 2013, Hook 2006, etc).   Given their different focus, these studies do not control for 
the historical legacies of state socialism listed above and thus ignore the context within which the 
independent variables gain meaning. Our explorations should contribute to and nuance these 
findings by isolating the impact of macro-economic and institutional predictors of gender 
inequality in a specific historical/ economic setting. 
ix  The choice of 2008 is deliberate: we selected the last pre-crisis year for our analysis.  Macro-
economic indicators became extremely volatile during the crisis years, so their usefulness for 
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other than describing this period is doubtful, especially since international statistics already 
indicate a gradual return to previous levels of gender inequality, growth, poverty, etc. 
x This process introduces an obvious selection bias, thus we will be careful with generalizations to 
the whole population of women. 
xi We will measure the gender poverty gap, i.e., women’s risk of poverty relative to men’s risk, our 
main interest, by interpreting the effect of gender on a person’s “risk of poverty”. 
xii In the whole sample, the poverty rate in the ten countries is 17.4%, for women 18.1% and for 
men 16.7%, see table 1. 
xiii We also ran the models with age and a squared term for age to capture non-linearity and the 
results were similar.   
xiv We do not formulate a hypothesis about the level of GDP and gender inequality for two 
reasons.  While the literature suggests a curvilinear relationship between gender inequality and 
development (less inequality at very low and very high levels of development), this finding is 
based on datasets, which include a much wider range of levels of development than what we have 
in our sample.  Second, our paper focuses on the impact of structural adjustment policy 
initiatives, but the level (rather than the rate of growth) of GDP is more closely associated with 
the legacies of the state socialist period than with more recent measures.  Finally, previous 
research on the gender poverty gap found no relationship between the level of GDP and gender 
inequality in poverty (Wieping and Maas 2005). 
xv Given that this variable now describes the previous few years, it may pick up the impact of 
sudden changes in the economy and their consequences for increasing/ decreasing people’s risk 
of poverty. 
xvi An alternative measure, the volume of FDI stock is highly correlated with FDI flow (.7) and 
yield similar results.  We believe the immediate and rapidly changing impact of FDI’s are better 
captured by this measure for our purposes (for a careful argument about the impact of foreign 
investment outflows see for example, Alderson and Nielsen 2002) 
xvii http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/learning/multilevel-models/samples.html. 
xviii Because of length limitations we do not present all the graphs here but selected a couple to 
demonstrate the method and make our results more accessible.  All the graphs are available upon 
request. 
xix  The level of GDP is related to the level of poverty in a country as well as its social investment 
and a number of unmeasured characteristics, which may be relevant for gender inequality.  This is 
why we chose it as a control for our models.  We explain our choice of not including it as one of 
the hypotheses in footnote 3.  In our earlier models we confirmed a negative correlation between 
the level of GDP and poverty, although none among GDP and the gender poverty gap. 
xx The relationship held steady even if we controlled for various measures of class inequality, such 
as the Gini coefficient or the ratio of income quintiles. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Scholars studying the impact of “economic development” have demonstrated both 
positive and negative associations between foreign investment, trade and financial 
liberalization, fast-paced growth, state austerity and gender inequality.  To contribute to 
this debate we set out to examine the consequences of these elements of the structural 
adjustment package in a context where women are expected to be less vulnerable than in 
other developing regions.  Our analysis suggests that within Central and Eastern Europe 
the gender poverty gap is larger in countries, which are currently undergoing fast-paced, 
foreign capital –led economic growth, and where, perhaps most important and closely 
related to this, welfare spending is lower and especially spending on pensions and family 
policies is meager.  These elements of the structural adjustment package are closely 
connected both in actual policy making practice and in political discourse. 
There are a number of reasons why fast paced, foreign capital lead economic 
growth would be associated with gender inequality.   Countries in this category focus 
most of their resources on achieving growth which does not translate (or has not yet 
translated) into well-being for the most vulnerable: women struggling to maintain 
independent households, especially elderly women and women who care for dependent 
children.  Having paid employment helps people avoid poverty, but a sizeable segment of 
the population earns the minimum or close to the minimum wage, which in Central and 
Eastern Europe represents a smaller portion (only about 35%) of the average wage than 
in more developed countries21 and is therefore not necessarily enough to lift families out 
of poverty.   For example, in 2008 a Hungarian working mother making the minimum 
wage and raising a child alone would have fallen some 200 Euros short of what the 
Hungarian Statistical Office set as the subsistence minimum and she would have to make 
about 180% of the minimum wage to be able to surpass the poverty threshold on her 
wages alone.22  Given the ubiquity of low wage, unstable employment in Central and 
Eastern Europe, especially for people with lower levels of education and those with care 
responsibilities, having a job is not a guarantee for avoiding destitution either in the 
short and especially not in the longer run.   
In addition, in many post-socialist countries a third to half of the adult 
population is jobless, have no chance of finding stable work or holding on to a paid 
position lacking adequate childcare and social support.  Indeed, the unavailability of 
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affordable childcare is the main reasons why in many CEE countries mothers drop out of 
the labor market for extended periods of time, which increases their own and their 
families’ risk of poverty.   In this context, the real question is how many members of this 
group can escape destitution and what institutions they can rely on for support.  The 
jobless, among whom women outnumber men, would only be helped by a type of 
economic development, which retains the social safety net and creates decent and stable 
employment accessible for people with care responsibilities.  Austerity measures meant 
cut backs on exactly these services, such as education and child care, or social services 
for the elderly, which increased the pool of the most vulnerable.  This research has 
confirmed that the state has a vital role in mediating the impact of structural adjustment 
policies on the poor, and especially poor women.  Indeed, many other ways in which the 
state matters have not been considered here (for example, public sector employment, 
setting conditions for foreign direct investment, spending on infrastructural 
developments, etc) and remains to be studied in the future. 
It is important to note that poverty in post-socialist countries typically entails 
more dire living conditions than in more developed regions, thus the day-to-day reality 
of gender inequality are harsher here.  In Europe’s fifteen most developed countries 
about 20% of poor people live in what is defined as overcrowded housing conditions, 
while in Central and Eastern Europe 50-68% of poor people do.23  Severe material 
deprivation is also more likely to be noted in the CEE region than in other parts of 
Europe.  In Bulgaria, for example, over 40% of people lacked resources considered basic 
for acceptable living conditions, while in Slovakia about 27%, in the Czech Republic 
16%.24 Compare this to the average in core EU countries at 5.8%.  Deprivation has 
serious consequences for people’s physical and mental health, as is evidenced by high 
rates of alcoholism and a reduced life expectancy not only among men but also among 
women in post-socialist countries25. 
Mainstream political-historical research has proposed typologies to describe the 
developmental paths of post-communist societies.   Their usefulness for studying gender 
inequality at the bottom of the social hierarchy is doubtless but their limitations are also 
clear.   For example, our research confirms the conceptualization of a Baltic model: even 
though more women are engaged in paid work, poor women fare rather badly relative to 
men in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, where they are radically exposed to and seem to 
suffer the consequences of structural adjustment policies.  Family benefits and pension 
payments are notoriously low in these countries and given their excessive wage gaps, 
32 
 
women are disadvantaged relative to men both at work and in old age.  There is no 
observable gender poverty gap in Hungary and Poland, both countries have so far 
managed to at least partially resist the insistence of international lenders for austerity 
while simultaneously courting foreign investors.   Even though a much smaller 
percentage of women work for wages in these two countries than in the Baltic region, 
pension reforms in the 1990s achieved a higher level of social security for older people, 
and thus a lower poverty rate for elderly women.   
Nevertheless, it is the exceptions, which may be most interesting.   We observed 
the largest gender poverty gaps in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, in the context of 
overall low poverty rates in the former and very high ones in the latter26. No researcher 
has ever listed these two countries in the same group of any typology.  Bulgaria is one of 
the poorest, while the Czech Republic one of the richest post-state socialist country, 
typically grouped together with Hungary and Poland.  The rate of foreign investment is 
exceptionally high in Bulgaria, while about average in the Czech Republic. In addition, 
there are important differences in the types of investments typically made in the two 
countries and their level of industrialization, labor costs and production cultures, etc.  
Social spending is relatively high in the Czech Republic, while it is quite low in Bulgaria.  
Women may take lengthy, well paid leave to care for a new child in the Czech Republic, 
while the decently enumerated portion of parental leave is shorter in Bulgaria.  These 
and further differences suggest that there are different paths towards gender inequality 
in poverty in the post-communist context.  Specifically, while in Bulgaria, low levels of 
social protection and the vulnerability and low quality of work in multinational 
companies, as well as overall large social inequalities contribute to the gender poverty 
gap, in the Czech Republic the causes are more likely found in the long-term withdrawal 
of mothers from the labor market, their difficulty to return and consequent 
impoverishment in the short run as well as by the time they reach pension age.   It is 
these paths that further research may seek to identify and explain.  
 Gender inequality is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. While Estonia, for 
example, has a sizeable gender poverty gap as well as the largest wage gap and extremely 
high levels of job segregation in the European Union, gender differences in access to paid 
work are smaller there than elsewhere.  Conversely, while women are not disadvantaged 
at the bottom of the social hierarchy relative to men in Hungary, women’s and especially 
mothers’ employment opportunities are especially unequal.  The gender gap in poverty, 
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while important, is thus only one of the dimensions along which gender regimes should 
be characterized. 
 
                                                 
21 Eurostat, Statstics in Focus, 2008. 
http://www.stockwatch.com.cy/media/announce_pdf/2008-11/minimum%20wages.pdf 
22 Data from the National Statistical Office of Hungary and using a 2008 average Euros to HUF 
exchange rate of 250 HUF/1 Euro.  
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/letmin/letmin08.pdf and 
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_qli041.html. 
23 Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_condition
s/data/main_tables, accessed September 1, 2014.  Data for 2008. 
24 Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi080
&plugin=1, accessed Sept 1, 2014.  Data for 2008. 
25 World Health Organization.  Status Report on Alcohol and Health in 35 European countries.  
0017/190430/Status-Report-on-Alcohol-and-Health-in-35-European-Countries.pdf 
26 We have found these two countries to have the largest gender poverty gap among CEE countries 
in 2010 and 2012 as well,  and the Czech Republic has by far the largest gap in 2006 (no data were 
collected in Bulgaria in that year yet).   These are the authors’ calculations using the 2006, 2010 
and 2012 waves of EU -SILC. 
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Appendix A: Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1.   
Poverty rates for un-partnered women and men in ten post-communist 
societies in CEE 
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Figure 2.   
Results from a two-stage regression model: economic growth and women’s 
disadvantage in poverty.  EU SILC 2008. 
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Figure 3.  
Results from a two-stage regression model:  spending on pensions and 
women’s disadvantage in poverty. 
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Table 1.   
Distribution of the dependent variable among individuals  
over 17 years or older 
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
 Per cent 
poor 
among 
un- 
partnere
d 
women 
Per cent 
poor 
among 
un- 
partnere
d 
men 
Per cent 
poor 
among 
all un- 
partnere
d 
Ratio 
(wome
n’s 
rate/m
en’s 
rate) 
Poverty 
differe
nce 
(wome
n’s rate 
minus 
men’s 
rate) 
Overal
l 
povert
y rate 
in full  
popula
tion 
over 
18 
N 
(full 
sample
) 
N (un- 
partner
ed) 
Hunga
ry 
12.9 14.4 13.5 0.90 -1.5 11.0 18,378 8,138 
Poland 20.8 23.1 21.7 0.90 -2.3 17.1 33,110 12,134 
Sloveni
a 
14.1 11.7 12.9 1.21 2.4 11.2 24,615 10,125 
Latvia 41.0 29.3 36.9 1.40 11.7 34.4 10,684 5,321 
Estoni
a 
32.9 24.6 29.5 1.34 8.3 22.1 10,582 4,641 
Roman
ia 
30.0 21.9 26.5 1.37 8.1 23.3 16,242 5,869 
Slovaki
a 
14.9 10.7 13.1 1.39 4.2 10.9 13,807 6,238 
Lithua
nia 
31.8 24.1 28.8 1.32 7.7 21.1 10,284 4,059 
Bulgari
a 
34.8 20.8 28.9 1.67 14 26.3 10,230 3,784 
Czech 
R 
16.0 8.9 13.0 1.80 7.1 8.6 22,431 8,912 
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Table 2.   
Distribution of the individual level variables in the models by gender 
Unpartnered individuals, full sample and lone mothers over 17 in ten post-
state socialist EU member states 
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
  Unpartnered 
women 
Unpartnered 
men 
Unpartnered 
all 
Full 
sample 
women 
Full 
sample 
men 
Full 
sample 
all 
Age (mean) 48.4 34.3 42.4 49.1 45.8 47.6 
Elderly 33.8 10.2 23.9 24.5 18 21.6 
Secondary 
education 
73.9 84.5 78.3 74.4 79.9 77.0 
College or more 13.2 9.3 11.5 15.6 13.4 14.6 
Extended family 
household 
19.0 22.4 20.4 19.2 20.4 19.7 
Working for 
wages 
30.1 46.1 36.8 42.1 55.4 48.3 
Children under 
12 in household 
44.3 45.7 44.9 48.0 48.9 48.4 
Poor 22.6 17.5 20.5 17.0 14.3 15.7 
No partner - - - 44.1 36.4 40.5 
N 40,201 29,049 69,292 81,206 92,294 173,415 
39 
 
 
Table 3.   
Distribution of country level variables in the models 
Source: see Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  GDP as % 
of EU-27 
GDP 
growth 
(3 year 
ave) 
FDI 
flow 
(3 
year 
ave) 
% state 
owned 
banks 
Pension 
spending 
Social 
protection 
Family 
protection 
Bulgaria 43 6.4 29.4 1.98 6.8 15.1 1.26 
Czech R 80 6.1 6.0 2.56 8.2 18.6 2.42 
Estonia 68 6.9 12.6 0 5.8 12.5 1.73 
Hungary 64 1.0 8.1 5.6 10.4 22.3 3.40 
Lithuania 62 9.8 5.2 0 6.6 14.3 1.19 
Latvia 57 10.0 2.9 7.3 5.2 11.0 1.17 
Poland 56 6.8 5.5 20.4 11.6 18.1 1.54 
Romania 42 6.3 5.8 5.8 6.3 12.8 1.66 
Slovenia 91 6.9 3.8 26.4 9.7 21.4 1.80 
Slovakia 72 10.6 4.8 1.1 7.2 16.0 2.19 
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Table  4.   
 
Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) predicting 
 the odds of being poor in a random coefficient model 
Individual level variables included only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU-SILC,  2008.  
Sample: Unpartnered individuals 17 and over, 10 post-state socialist EU members states.  
* represents coefficients statistically significant at p<.05 (two tailed tests). 
 Un-
partnered 
individuals 
Woman .16* 
(.09) 
 Age .01* 
(.00) 
Elderly -.65* 
(.04) 
Secondary school -.47* 
(.03) 
College graduate -1.5* 
(.05) 
Working for wages -.96* 
(.03) 
Children under 12 in 
household 
.06* 
(.03) 
Extended household -.46* 
(.03) 
Constant -.99* 
(.14) 
N 69,293 
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Table  5.   
Logistic regression coefficients from random coefficient models predicting 
odds of being poor 
  
Hypothesis set 1: Level, pace and pattern of economic development 
 
Note: GDP per capita is used as a control variable only.  
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
Sample: Unpartnered individuals 17 and over, 10 post-state socialist EU members states.  
* indicates coefficients statistically significant at p<.05 (two tailed tests) 
(*) indicates coefficients statistically significant at p<.10  
 Model 
1.1 
Model 
1.2 
Model 
1.3 
Model 
1.4 
Model 
1.5 
Model 
1.6 
Individual 
level 
predictors 
and GDP 
included included included included included included 
Woman .14 
(.10) 
-.51 (*) 
(.26) 
.17 (*) 
(.09) 
-.10 
(.16) 
.17* 
(.09) 
.34* 
(.10) 
GDP growth 
(3 year ave) 
.13* 
(.03) 
.10* 
(.03) 
- - - - 
GDP growth 
*woman 
- .09* 
(.03) 
- - - - 
FDI flow 
(3 year ave) 
- - -.02 
(.02) 
.00 
(.03) 
- - 
FDI flow* 
woman 
- - - .04* 
(.02) 
- - 
% state 
banks 
- - - - .02 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.02) 
% state 
banks* 
woman 
- - - - - -.03* 
(.01) 
Constant -.06 
(.46) 
-.49 
(.40) 
.65 
(.64) 
.49 
(.64) 
.29 
(.45) 
-.09 
(.19) 
N 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 
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Table  6.   
Logistic regression coefficients from random coefficient models predicting 
odds of being poor 
 
Hypothesis set 2:  Welfare state generosity and types 
 
Source: EU-SILC, 2008.  
Sample: Unpartnered individuals 17 and over, 10 post-state socialist EU members states.  
* coefficients are statistically significant at p<.05 (two tailed tests)
 Model 
2.1 
Model 
2.2 
Model 
2.3 
Model 
2.4 
Model 
2.5 
Model 
2.6 
Individual level 
predictors and 
GDP 
included included included included included included 
Woman .14 
(.10) 
.89* 
(.39) 
.15 
(.10) 
1.04 
(.25) 
.15 
(.09) 
.64* 
(.24) 
Social protection -.09* 
(.02) 
-.08* 
(.02) 
- - - - 
Social 
protection*women 
- -.05* 
(.02) 
- - - - 
Pension - - -.09* 
(-.05) 
-.07 
(.05) 
- - 
Pension*woman - - - -.12* 
(.03) 
- - 
Family protection - - - - -.34* 
(.14) 
-.34* 
(.14) 
Family 
protection*women 
- - - - - -.26* 
(.13) 
Constant 1.02* 
(.37) 
.75* 
(.39) 
.81 
(.49) 
.61 
(.49) 
.59 
(.39) 
.57 
(.39) 
N 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 69,293 
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Appendix B.  Sources and details of macro-level data 
 
Note: all websites last accessed June 21, 2011. 
All data are for 2007 unless otherwise indicated. 
 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product, per capita, at PPP in 2007, as a % of EU average. 
Source: Eurostat:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=
tsieb010&plugin=1 
 
GDPgrowth- 3 year average 
Real GDP growth rate for 2005-2007, simple average. 
Source: Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=
tsieb020&plugin=1 
 
FDI flow 
FDI direct investment flow into the reporting country as % of GDP, 2005-2007, simple 
average. 
Source: Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=
tec00046&plugin=1 
 
Social Protection 
Total expenditure on social protection as % of GDP. 
Source: Eurostat 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=
tps00098&plugin=0 
 
Pension 
Expenditure on pensions as % of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=
tps00103&plugin=1, 
 
Family protection 
Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures, in per cent of 
GDP, 2007 
Source: OECD Family database, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml 
 
% State owned banks 
Asset share of state owned banks, 2004-7 
Source:  Andries Alin Marius, and Capraru Bogdan. 2013.  “Impact of Financial 
Liberalization on Banking Sectors Performance from Central and Eastern European 
Countries.” PLoS ONE 8(3): e59686. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0059686 
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